PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
BANK CHECKS.

The much-vexed question of how far the depositor of negotiable paper may hold the bank of deposit for the proceeds,
meets with a new decision in Wilson v. Carlinville, 58 N. E.
Lablity

250.

In that case the customer of the bank had de-

posited a check of a third person with the bank,
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therefor
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bank for collection. By the negligence of this
Negligence
latter bank the amount of the check was lost. The Supreme
Court of Illinois holds that th& second bank is the agent'of
the depositor, and that therefore the bank of deposit is not
liable to him, but may recover from him the amount of such
check, since he has drawn against the credit secured on it.
The decisions of numerous courts are referred to, and appear
about equally di(ided. In accord with this decision are
(interalia) Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland and Louisiana, and opposed are (inter alia) Michigan, New York, Ohio
and the courts of the United States.
Bank for

Subagent's

BILLS AND NOTES.

The question whether one who sells property to another
for the purpose of defrauding his creditors can maintain an
action on a note given by the vendee for the purchase money,
Consideration, is one which has divided the opinions of the courts
Settlement of of this country. Some hold the action not maintainable; among these are New York and New
Fraudulent
Partnership

Jersey.

Others regard them valid and binding

contracts; Massachusetts, Vermont, Pennsylvania, etc. See
Winton v. Freeman, 102 Pa. 366.
This question was recently presented to the Supreme Court
of Arkansas in a somewhat modified form. A. and B. formed a
partnership to be conducted in A.'s name for the purpose of
deceiving B.'s creditors. Later a settlement is had between the
partners, and B. transfers his interest to A. and receives from
A. the note in suit. Held, B. may recover against A. The
illegality is in the prior agreement, and the settlement was
held not to be so tainted by this as to prevent a recovery on
the note in suit : Harcrowv. Ilarcrow, 58 S. W. 553.
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CARRIERS.

In Proctor v. Southern California Railway Co., 62 Pac. 306,
the elements of damages that may enter into the award of the
Ejectmentof jury for a wrongful ejectment from a passenger
Passenger, train is discussed by the Supreme Court of CaliOn the one hand it is decided that injury
Mesure of fornia.
to plaintiff's good name from such a cause may
Damages
not be an element of damage; but that the fact that her trunk
was carried on several thousand miles while she was left
without a change of clothing, by reason of which she was
compelled to buy, gave her the right to have the inconvenience and discomfort thus caused her taken into consideration
in the estimate of damages.
In Chattanooga Rapid Transit Co. v. Vendle, 58 S. W. 86i,
it appeared that it was the custom of the railroad to carry an
employe to his work without payment of fare. Under these
circumstances the Supreme Court of Tennessee
Injury to
Employe, Free holds that the employe, not being on the train in
Passenger the line of his duty, is a passenger, and on proof of
injuries having been received while so riding, negligence will
be inferred from the collision which occasioned them. O'Donnell v. Railroad, 59 Pa. 246, is cited as in accord.
The rightfulness of his presence on the train, so far as the
liability of the company is concerned, the court makes depend on the conductor's treatment of him. "His presence
on the train by the permission of the conductor to be implied
from his knowledge that the party was there, and his neglect
to enforce the company's rule by requiring fare or a pass
made such person a passenger.'
CONSTITUTIONAL1 LAW.

An Act of the Legislature of Michigan required merchants
selling farm produce upon commission to execute a bond in the
Requirement penal sum of %5,ooo,conditioned for the faithful perof Bond from formance of their contracts, and to pay a license
Commission fee. In Valentine v. Berrien Circuit/Judge,83 N.W.,
594, the Supreme Court of the State, in a very brief
rlerchant
opinion, holds the act unconstitutional, first, because it is class
legislation, and second, because it is an unjustifiable interference with the right of citizens to carry on legitimate business.
The court regards the act as finding no justification whatever
in the police power, and says: "The legislature of this state
is not empowered by the Constitution to regulate contracts
between its citizens who are engaged in legitimate commercial
business, or to require any class of persons to pay a fee for the
right to carry on business, or to give a bond to perform their
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

contracts which other parties may choose to make with them."
Apart from its decision, the case is very interesting in respect
to the tenor of its language, illustrated by the sentence just
quoted. "The legislature," says the court, "is not empowered," etc. Are we to understand by this that in the view of
the Michigan Supreme Court a State Legislature should be
limited to such powers as are conferred? Doubtless this position has its advocates, but it is surprising to find from this
court even this much countenance to such a view.
In Newburyport Water Co. v. City of Newburyport, 103
Fed. 584, the U. S. Circuit Court (D. Mass.) holds that where
Due Process of a municipal corporation takes for the use of
Law, Just the municipality a system of water-works of a
Compensation private corporation, an estimate which fixes such

value "without enhancement on account of future earning
capacity, or good-will, or on account of the franchise of said
company," is a taking without just compensation, and hence is
in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the National
Constitution.
Against the dissent of three judges, the Court of Appeals
of New York holds that a law making it a misdemeanor
Game Laws,
Regulation of
Commerce

to catch, kill or have the possession of certain
kinds of fish during certain periods of the year,
and imposing a penalty for the violation thereof,

in as far as it affects the possession and right of sale by
citizens of New York of fish imported from a foreign country,
is in conflict with the power of Congress to regulate commerce, and to such extent is void: People v. Buffalo Fisk
Co., 58 N. E. 34.
An act of the Legislature of Maine forbade peddling by any
other than one who had regularly obtained a license, and excluded from the right to a license all except citizens of the
Equal
United States. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Protection of that state in State v. Montgomery, 47 Atl. I65,
the Laws

holds the act unconstitutional, on the ground that

it violates the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, which secures to all persons within the jurisdiction of a
state the equal protection of the laws, in that it refused a
license to aliens. They are necessarily persons within the
jurisdiction of the state, and it is held that to refuse them a
license merely because they are not citizens and to subject
them to penalties for selling without license deprives them of
the equal protection to which they are entitled. This leads
to a queer result in the case in hand. The man indicted for a
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violation of the statute was not an alien; but it was held that
the defect invalidated the whole act, since to hold it constitututional in the part requiring a license from citizens and
unconstitutional in the part punishing aliens (who, under the
act, could not get a license) for sales without a license, was in
effect a discrimination against citizens.
CONTRACTS.

In Alabama the code provides that usurious contracts cannot
be enforced either at law or in equity, except as to the principal sum due. But in Lindsay v. U. S. Savings and Loan Co.,
28 Southern, 716, the Supreme Court of the state
Action to
Set Aside on holds that this does not prohibit a court of equity,
Groundof
in a suit by a borrower for relief against a usurious
Usury
contract, from granting such relief, on condition
that the complainant repay the borrowed money, with legal
interest thereon. The court proceeds on the ground that this
was the procedure before the enactment of the code, and rests
on the equitable maxim that "he who seeks equity must do
equity "; and that the language of the code is not clear enough
to show an intent to change the rule. One judge dissents on
the ground that the statute is broad enough to cover this, as
well as the admitted case where the lender seeks to enforce.
With all the present-day agitation against trusts, monopolies, contracts in restraint of trade, etc., the paucity of decisIn Restraint ions actually occurring is rather surprising. In
Tuscaloosa Ice Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 28 South. Trade
ern, 669, a contract is attacked on this ground, not in view of
any legislation on the subject, but as violative of the general
principles of the common law. Plaintiff and defendant each
owned an ice plant in Tuscaloosa, Ala. There were no
other ice factories there, and plaintiff, in consideration that
defendant should pay him $175 annually, agreed not to run
his ice plant nor suffer it to be run for five years, unless he
should sell it, in which case he released defendant from all
subsequent payments. There was the further stipulation that
if a rival company began business, then defendant should pay
plaintiff the difference between $5oo and the amount already
paid. This happened, and defendant refusing to pay this
Recovery was refused, on the
difference, plaintiff sued.
ground that the contract was void as against public policy,
stifling competition and promoting monopoly. The court
meets the argument that the restraint is reasonable both as to
time and place by saying that that rule applies primarily to
the case where a business is sold and with it the good-will of
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CONTRACTS (Continued).

the business, in which case such restraints are not injurious to
the public, since their primary object is notlto stifle competition; but that if they should be used as a c oak for this purpose, the fact that such covenant accompanied a sale would not
be a protection to the parties. This contract, it is said, is
clearly for the one purpose of suppressing competition. Of
course many of the old authorities may be cited in support of
such a position, but under modern business theories a contract of this kind, leaving the one party so wide a field for his
operations, and the other open to competition from every
source except this one-which competition he very soon feltcan hardly be regarded as a serious menace to public interests.
CRIMES.

In Barker v. State, 28 Southern, 589, the Supreme Court
of Alabama holds that in a prosecution for carrying concealed
carrying
weapons, evidence that at the time the offence
Conc aled
was charged the weapon was not intentionally
Weapons
concealed is inadmissible, since intentional concealment is not necessary to const;tute guilt.
The same court holds in Thomas v. State, 28 Southern, 591,
that "words, however insulting or abusive, will not serve to
Homicide,
reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter."
nurderand The lack of justification of an assault in such
rianslaughter words at once suggests itself, and an analogy to
the rule here declared.
In Commonwealth v. Hurd, 58 S. W. 369, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that under an indictment
for burglary there may be a conviction of the
offence of housebreaking; that being a degree of
the offence charged.
Burglary,
Degrees
of Offences

A decision from the same court, Blanton v. Commonwealth,
58 S. W. 422, holds that to constitute robbery the taking
Robbery,
must be by violence or by putting in fear; but
Elementsof
both these circumstances need not concur. It is
Crime
sufficient to charge the taking as done "unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously and forcibly," and against the will
and consent of the person from whom the property was taken.
"The proper charge to a jury in a criminal case is that the
jury, and not that each juror should be convinced beyond
Reasonable
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused
Doubt
before finding him guilty :" Davis v. State, 57 N.
E. lO98 (Ohio).
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It is held in State v. Chauvet, 83 N. W, 717, by the Supreme
Court of Iowa that an indictment for keeping a house of ill
fame is sustained by showing that defendant kept
House of
a covered wagon, drawn from place to place, and
Ill Fame
used for the purposes of his illegal traffic.
In Woodharn v. Allen, 62 Pac. 398, the defendant had extorted money and goods from the plaintiff by menaces and
threats to prosecute her husband for a felony, of which he was
Compounding
a Felony

innocent, unless she paid a certain sum of money.

The Supreme Court of California holds that this
is not a compounding of a felony, since no felony had been
committed. It was also held that there could be a recovery
by the wife for the property so obtained, that "the stifling of
a prosecution against an innocent man cannot be wrong in an
equal degree to the prosecution itself," and, quoting Lord
Ellenborough: "'This is not a case of par delictum, It is
oppression on one side and submission on the other, It never
can be predicated as par delictum when one holds the rod and
the other bows to it."'
DEDS.

In Munro v. Bowles, 58 N. E. 331, the Supreme Court of
Illinois is met by the old question of the sufficiency of
the delivery of a deed when it practically remains in the
Delivery in

control of the grantor, and the grantee is not a

party to the delivery. In this case the grantor
desired to convey land to his son, and made a deed,
which he delivered to his housekeeper with instructions to
deliver to the son after his (the father's) death. The housekeeper placed the deed in the grantor's trunk, with a receipt
of hers which she kept there. The grantor carried the key to
the triink, but never attempted to regain possession of the
deed. The court held the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that there was a delivery in escrow. One judge dissents
on the ground that practically the deed never left either the
possession or the control of the grantor.
Escrow

DOWER

The general rule of law that a widow has no dower in land
of which her husband is trustee is applied in Gardner v.
Gardner,36 S. E. 985, to the case where the husHusband
Constructive band is not an express, but a constructive trustee;
the Supreme Court of Virginia holding that a
Trustee
widow has no dower where lands were bought and paid for
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DOWER (Continued).
by another, and conveyed to the husband by inadvertence.
However, the court, in this case, did not regard the title of
the husband sufficiently impeached and allowed dower.
EVIDENCE.

The extent to which a defendant waives his privilege not to
be compelled to testify against himself when indicted for a
Privilege of crime, by voluntarily taking the stand, appears in
Witness
the case of People v. Ecarius, 83 N. W. 628, in
which the Supreme*Court of Michigan held that where the
defendant was charged with a murder which had been committed with an iron bar, and testified on his own behalf, on
cross-examination he might be compelled to put such bar in
his pocket to show the manner in which it. might have been
concealed before the commission of the crime.
Galveston, &c. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 58 S. W. 622, was a case
where suit was brought for the death of the engineer of a railway company's train through the company's negligence, and
the life.
Tables ft the usual question arose as to the value of
Mortality, The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas held that
Extra
notwithstanding the occupation of deceased was
extra hazardous the" American Experience Tables
Hazardous
of Mortality" were admissible in evidence as a
Occupation
relevant fact bearing on the expectancy of deceased's life.
The court says the question has not often been presented, and
where it has been attempted to be raised, the courts have refrained from deciding it. But it is regarded as relevant for jury
to consider what the expectancy of a man of deceased's age and
health was, as ascertained generally in ordinary walks of life;
and then to have regard to any circumstances in the case tending to modify this figure.
EXECUTORS.
That the powers conferred in a will, over and above those
given executors by the law, cannot be legally exercised by
persons named as executors until they have qualiPower to
Execute
fled as such, appears in the Kentucky case of
In that case the
mortgage
Andrews v. Muir, 58 S. W. 443.
persons named in the will as executors with power to sell and
convey real estate, and make such provision for the payment
of debts as they deemed best, were held, since they had not
qualified as executors, to have no power to mortgage testator's real estate, their duties till they qualified being purely
executorial.
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

In Ward v. Ward, 57 N. E. 1095, the Supreme Court of
Ohio holds that a conveyance by a man who has entered into
Anticipation a contract of marriage, which later takes place,
granting a portion of his land to his sons by a
of
former marriage, on the sole consideration of natMarriage
ural love and affection, and without the knowledge and consent of his contemplated wife, is fraudulent as to her and she
is entitled to dower therein. There is one dissenting opinion
regarding such a transfer as working no injustice, but as being
based on a "legal, as well as a moral, right to convey a fair
proportion of his real estate to his children by the deceased
wife."
FEDERAL COURTS.

It is held in Ezparte Glenn, 103 Fed. 947 (D., W. Va.), that
where a person has been regularly indicted for violation of
the criminal statutes of a state, and is in the custody of the
state authorities, he will not be discharged before
.Jursdicton trial by the Federal Court, on habeascorpus, on the
Where
ground that he was forcibly and illegally brought
Prisoner
Wrongfully within the jurisdiction, but he will be required to
Broughtfrom submit his rights under the Federal laws for adAnother State judication, in the first instance, to the courts of
the state. "If upon the trial any rights of the petitioner protected by the Federal law are violated, then an application
for a writ of habeas corpus will be proper, and her rights as
fully protected after the trial as before."
In American Sugar Refining Co. v. City of New Orleans,
1O4 Fed. 2, the Circuit Court of Appeals refuses to take jurisdiction, since the controlling question involved the construcand application of the Constitution of the
Juri i-ction of
C. C. A. Where United States. The writ of error was dismissed,
but, of course, without prejudice to any right of
Federai
appeal to the Supreme Court. One judge (McQuestion
Cormick, J.) dissents on the ground that this question was not
raised by the plaintiff's pleading and the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court was not dependent upon it, but the majority
held otherwise, notwithstanding these considerations to the
contrary.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The question which has several times of late arisen, as to
the wife's right to sue for the alienation of her husband's
affections, was in issue in the Illinois case of Betser v. Betser,
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58 N. E. 249, where the Supreme Court of that
state held she could maintain such action. The
common law objection, the court says, arises out
of the necessity for joining the husband in any action brought
by the wife, and this is obviated by the Illinois statute allowing her to sue and be sued without joining her husband, to
the same extent as if sole. The court admits that "the weight
of authority, at least in a number of cases decided, holds that
the wife cannot maintain" such action for the loss of the
affections or society of her husband.
Alienation o
Husband's
Affections

The common law mode of marriage is recognized as valid
in Alabama, and it is held in Tarttv. Negus, 28 Southern, 713,
that to constitute it, it is only necessary that there shall exist
Common Law a mutual consent or agreement between the parties
Marriage
to be husband and wife, followed by cohabitation
and living together as husband and wife. If this occurs, the
law establishes the status of marriage without regard to what
the parties considered the legal effect to be. So it is held that
several requests of the defendant to charge that there was no
marriage unless A. considered B. his wife were properly
refused.
INJUNCTION.

"The Chancery Court is without jurisdiction to determine
a question of disputed title on a bill to restrain trespasses
upon land." In Hamilton v. Brent Lumber Co., 28 South"Restraining ern, 698, the Supreme Court of Alabama holds
Trespasses
that this rule prevents the court from determining
Where Title a question of disputed title, not only for the purDisputed
pose of adjudicating such title, but for any other
purpose in the case, such as referring the possession to one
party or the other, when neither is in actual possession. In
the case before the court the effort was made by the complainant to restrain the defendant from cutting down trees,
and, title being disputed, the Supreme Court held that the
proper procedure would have been to require complainant to
establish his right at law, but that an injunction might have
been allowed to give him reasonable time to do this.
INSURANCE.

The well-established rule that a beneficiary who murders
the insured cannot profit by his own wrong and receive the
proceeds of the policy from the insurance company is reiter-
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niurdcr o

Insured,
Liability of

Company

ated in Schmidt v. Northern Life Association, 83
N. W. 8oo. The Supreme Court of Iowa notes
the exception which seems to be found to this
rule "in cases relating to the descent of property

where the statutes make no exceptions, as in

.

.

.

In re

Carpenter'sEstate, 170 Pa. 203." But it finds a more difficult
point as to the proper disposition to be made of the funds
arising from the policy. Clearly, they hold, the company's
liability is not terminated, and they liken the case to the one in
which the insured designates one outside of those allowed by
statute to whom the proceeds shall be paid, in which case it
becomes payable to those who would have been entitled to it,
if there had been no designation. These are held to be the
proper persons to receive their proportionate shares in this
case, and a right of action is held to exist in the administrator
to recover it for them. The underlying principle apparently
is that the beneficiary becomes constructive trustee, since it
would be inequitable to allow him to retain funds so acquired.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

In Deitrick v. Cashie & Chowan R. and Lumber Co., 37
S. E. 64, a servant sued his employer on the ground of
wrongful discharge. He showed the contract of employment
Wrongful for a specified time, and the discharge within that
Discharge, time. The court charged that the jury must be
Burden of satisfied by the greater weight of evidence that
the discharge was wrongful. The Supreme
Proof
Court of North Carolina holds this error: that the burden
of showing cause for such discharge is on the master.
The boundaries of the duty of the master to his servants in
regard to the tools with which he furnishes them, are carefully
Duty of nlaster drawn in the case of Clements v. Alabama Great
to Furnish Southern R. Co., 28 Southern, 643 (Ala.). The
Safe Tools, etc. Court says: "The employer,while under the duty

to use due and reasonable care and diligence in selecting and
providing safe and suitable appliances for the employe, does
not guarantee that they shall be free from defects or the best
in use, and is not the insurer of their safety. The test in all
cases involving the question is whether or not the employer
failed to use ordinary care and prudence in the selection of the
appliances. Without negligence there can be no liability." On
this ground, the allegation having merely been that master
had not provided good, proper and suitable tools, the court
held the statement insufficient; that it should have added that
the master knew or ought to have known the defects.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

In McAulif#e v. City of Victor, 62 Pac. 231, the Court of
Appeals of Colorado draws the distinction between the liaLiabilityfor bility of a city for the negligence of its agents
Negligence
when the acts which are being done, attempted
or permitted, are "for the benefit of the individuals who
are inhabitants of the municipality," and where the acts
concern "the exercise by the municipality of the judicial or
governmental authority which may have been the subject of
the power granted." In the former case the court holds the
city is liable for the negligence of its agents, but is not in the
latter; and that under this rule it is exempted from liability
under the circumstances of this case. A prisoner was injured
by fire which broke out in the jail. The negligence of the city
consisted in not having water at hand to meet such emergencies. Admitting the negligence, the court held the plaintiff
not entitled to recover. The case claims to follow the prevailing rule, but admits that at least in North Carolina a different
doctrine prevails.
But the Supreme Court of New Hampshire makes a much
more careful review of this question in Rholidas v. City of
Concord,47 Atl. 82, classifying the cases of liability and nonliability of municipalities. Among the various cases where
liabilty does exist, the court holds that towns are liable at
common law "for negligent acts (even in the discharge of
imposed duties) which interfere with the rights of others, provided such rights do not depend upon the imposed duty ;" and
on this basis it draws a distinction between the man whose
land is flooded by the negligence of a municipality and the
traveler who receives injuries by reason of a defect in the highway; the former being injured in a right which exists at common law, the right of private property, the latter being injured
by a "violation of the statutory highway right of a traveler,
by a non-performance of the defendants' statutory duty of
keeping the highway 'in good repair, suitable for the travel
thereon.'" The court applies this rule to the case where a
servant in the city waterworks department, had received
injuries by reason of the city's officers or agents, and holds
the city liable.
In the case of Flanders v. City of Franklin, 47 AtI. 88,
immediately following the above case, the court follows the
rule there laid down, applying it to the case where the land ot
A. is flooded by the faulty system of drains, etc., used by a
city, and holds the city liable.
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NEGLIGENCE.

Whether in an action by decedent's personal representative
for his death, through the negligence of defendant, the defence may be set up that the decedent was violating a statute
Actionfor
Death, Work
on Sunday

forbidding under penalty work on Sunday, is a

question as to which, says the Supreme Court
of Vermont, in Hoadley v. International Paper
Co., 47 Atl. 169, courts have differed. But it is held in this
case, as the better view, that such facts do not constitute a
defence.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi holds, in Illinois Central
R, Co. v. fohnson, 28 Southern, 753, that under the act giving a
right of action to a brother or sister for the death of a sister
Action for
Death,

or brother caused by negligence, no right of ac-

tion is given to an illegitimate sister. The court
jitegltlmnata sketches the common law view of the rights of illegitimates, and holds this statute is in derogation of
Relative
the common law and to be strictly construed. Even a mother,
it points out, cannot recover for the death of her own illegitimate child, citing Harkinsv. R. R. Co., 15 Phila. 286, and others.
The court is apparently very much moved by the argument of
counsel for the illegitimate sister, to which it refers as" true eloquence-the lightning of passion playing along the links of
thought. But we must content ourselves with the ice-cold
law, from which no friction will excite sparks."
In Thomas v. Bellamy, 28 Southern, 707, we find a rule
stated somewhat the converse of the general rule that a master should inform his servants as to the general character of
naster

and

their work and its peculiar dangers. The Supreme

-ervant, Duty Court of Alabama here holds that where a servant
to Warn knows of a dangerous defect in the machine which
he operates, and fails to notify the master or such agent of
the master as is entrusted with the care of the machine, he
cannot recover from the master, though he has sought to
render the machine safe himself and has called the attention of
a foreman to it, such foreman not being charged with the care
of the machine.
The case of Birmingham v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.,
37 S. E. i6, is an illustration of the frequent effort to obtain
Umitation of advantages by suing in assumpsit when the action
arises ex delicto, the tort being waived. The limiAction,
Form of
tation of negligence actions in Virginia is one year;
in actions on contracts not expressly mentioned
Action
in their code, three years. In this case the plaintiff received
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personal injuries while being carried on the defendant railway.
In order to avoid the bar of the former statute he sued in
assumpsit as on the contract to safely transport the plaintiff
over its railroad, but the court held that: "The limitation is
not determined by the form of the action, but by its object. If
the thing complained of is an injury to the person, the limitation in assumpsitis the same as if the action were in form ex
delicto," and held the action in this case barred at the expiration of one year.
In Toners Administrator v. South Covington & C. St. Ry
Co., 58 S. W. 439 (Kentucky), it is held that in an action by
a father as administrator to recover damages
Action for
Death of Child for the death of his infant son, about four years
old, the contributory negligence of the mother will be
imputed to the plaintiff; it not being necessary that the father
should also have been negligent to bar the recovery.
SALES.
In Martin v. Martin, 35 Ala. 560, the principle was laid
down that a restoration of the property or abandonment of it
is not essentially a prerequisite to the filing of a bill for the
Rescission of rescission of the contract of sale. This was quesContract of tioned in Eureka Co. v. Edwards,7 1 Ala. 248, as not
5ale for Praud

being sustained by authorities.

In Perry v. Boyd,

28 Southern, 711, the Supreme Court of Alabama upholds the
earlier case, regarding it as supported by the decisions of the
state. This is clearly consistent with the weight of authority.
In Meyer v. Parsons,62 Pac. 216, A., as a part of the purchase price of property bought, contracted to pay certain debts
Contract to of B., the vendor. The Supreme Court of CaliPay Debts of fornia held that this was not a contract to answer
Vendor
for the debt or default of another, but was a "contract of sale, accompanied with a delivery of the property
sold," and that it was therefore not within the Statute of
Frauds. It is further laid down that on such a contract where
A. fails to pay the debts, or to release B. from liability therefor
within a reasonable time after maturity, he is liable to B. for
the amount of such debts; and it is not essential to B.'s right
of action on the contract to recover the amount that he should
himself have paid such debts.
SLANDER.
In Brooks v. Collier, 58 S. W. 559, the Court of Appeals of
Indian Territory held that the trial court erred in overruling
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a demurrer to an action for slander brought in the name of
JoinderofTwo two plaintiffs. "There can be, from the very
as Plaintiffs nature of things, no joint damage to the character
of individuals. . . . A slander which would crush a weak,
highly sensitive man would fall harmless at the .feet of a
strong, self-reliant one." After the trial, atid judgment for
both plaintiffs, the court, pn motior, cf 'he plaintiff, struck
from the record theXT"i bf one plintiff and remitted half the
damages. Held 6i.crr. The estimate of danages is for the
jury. And this "ubsequent ruling Cduld aot cure original
error.

ST"ET RAILWAYS.

A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
Krueger v. Telephone Co., 8i N. W. io4i, held that the use of
the streets for telephone poles and lines was an
Additional
Burden
additional burden on the fee of the street, and,
being such, gave a right of action to the owner of the fee.
The same court now holds, in La Crosse City Ry. Co. v.
Higbee, 83 N. W. 7l, that this doctrine does not apply to
electric street railroads, because such railroads are merely an
improved method of using the street to effect its original
design. So the supporting trolley-wire pole is likewise held
to be no additional burden if placed with reasonable regard
for the convenience of the owner of the fee of the land on
which it is located, and so as not to materially interfere with
access to his lot outside the street line. Under these decisions a nice question would arise if in the future trolley poles
should at the same time be used for telephone wires.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee holds, in Clattanooga
Electric Ry. Co. v. Boddy, 58 S.W.646, that the special degree of care owed by a street railway as a common carrier
WhenRelation to its passengers ceases at the moment when the
iolPasseng.r man steps from the car upon the street; and the
railway company is not responsible to him, as
ceases
condition of the street, or for his safe passage
for
the
carrier,
from the car to the sidewalk. The rule is applied to the case
where a man, having alighted, was going around the rear end
of the car, and just about to cross a parallel track when he
was struck by a car going in the direction opposite to that of
his car. The court admits a conflict of authority, but regards
the better view to place the liability of the company on the
same basis with its liability to the traveler and not to the
passenger, from the moment when the man has left the car.
Buzby v. Traction Co., 126 Pa. 559, is cited as in accord.

